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Abstract
This paper oﬀers a theory of how the degree of corruption that prevails in a society
responds to changes in the ownership structure of major public service providers. We
show that there are cases in which privatization, even though it fosters investments in
infrastructure, also opens the door to more corruption. The public dissatisfaction towards
privatization is then crucially aﬀected by the changes in the degree and pattern of corrup-
tion. Our model thus helps understand the seemingly paradoxical situation prevailing in
Latin America, where most studies find that privatizations have been eﬃciency-enhancing
and have fostered investments and, at the same time, popular dissatisfaction with the
process is extremely high, especially among the middle class. We show that this line of
explanation is supported by evidence from surveys in the region.
1We thank Paulina Beato for having initiated this research and the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank for its financial support. We also thank Antonio Estache and seminar participants
at University of Edinburgh and the IDEI-IVE conference on “Public Services and Management:
Designs, Issues and Implications for Local Governance” in Toulouse for useful comments. The
usual disclaimer applies.
2University of Toulouse (IDEI) and Institut Universitaire de France.
3University of Edinburgh.
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1 Introduction
Since the second half of the 1980s, Latin America has been the leading region in attract-
ing private participation in infrastructure projects, from telecommunication and energy
(electricity and natural gas) to transport (roads, railways, ports and airports) and water
(potable water and sewage). Between 1990 and 2001, this type of investments in the Latin
American and Caribbean region amounted to $361 bn., approximately 48% of the total
for developing countries.1 Looking from a diﬀerent angle, in Latin America the proceeds
from privatization in the period 1990-99 summed up to $178 bn. (equivalent to 56.3%
or total privatization revenues in the developing world).2 Strikingly, by the early 2000s
there was in most Latin American countries a strong and rising public discontent with
the outcome of privatization, a decline in private investors’ interest and an often open
defiance from newly elected governments. By now, the optimistic mood of the 1990s is
largely forgotten, and some even question the validity of the privatization paradigm that
once was a cornerstone of reforms in the region. In some countries, renationalization is
again on the agenda.
Figure 1: Percentage of respondents who (strongly) disagree that privatization has
been beneficial for their country
0 20 40 60 80 100
Honduras
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Venezuela
Mexico
Guatemala
L.A.
Nicaragua
Ecuador
Paraguay
Uruguay
Peru
El Salvador
Bolivia
Panama
Argentina
2003
1998
Source: Latinobarometro 2001 and 2003.
1See Harris (2003). Note that investment figures generally report commitments, and that eﬀective
investments end up being substantially lower (Estache, 2004).
2This should be compared, for instance with $65 bn. in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and $44
bn. in East Asia and the Pacific (Chong and Lo´pez-de-Silanes, 2004).
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As far as public perceptions are concerned, the main evidence comes from Latino-
barometro, a survey of public opinion conducted yearly in several Latin American coun-
tries since 1995.3 As of 2003, in the 17 countries surveyed, negative views of privatization
ranged from 53% in Honduras to 83% in Argentina, for a Latin American average above
67%. Furthermore, negative opinions had increased significantly since 1998, going for
example from below 50% to 83% in Argentina, from 38% to 75% in Bolivia and from 48%
to almost 73% in Peru (see Figure 1).4
On the other hand, most evaluations of the impact of privatization point to improve-
ments in financial and operating performance.5 For instance, Chong and Lope´z-de-Silanes
(2004), in a recent eﬀort to overcome the sample selection bias inherent to reduced sample
studies and to get comparable data across seven Latin American countries (Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru), document improvements in profitability
(net income to sales, operating income to sales), in operating eﬃciency (cost per unit,
sales to assets and sales to employee ratio), and in output after the change in ownership.6
Additionally, a number of studies7 have focused on the impact of those privatizations
on fiscal balance,8 social welfare,9 prices,10 employment,11 and wages.12 In a nutshell,
it appears that to date, and despite a relatively adverse economic phase in the late 90s,
privatization improved fiscal stability and had mostly neutral to positive eﬀects on welfare
and social outcomes,13 while the two areas in which some negative eﬀects are observed
are prices and employment.
The available evidence shows that prices may have increased in about half of the
privatization cases, an evolution thought to be necessary to bring heavily subsidized prices
in line with marginal costs, attract much needed investments and quality improvements,
as well as allow tariﬀ changes when cross-subsidies were eliminated. However, it has also
been shown that price increases were sometimes due to large indirect tax premia on basic
3See www.latinobarometro.org (last visited 13/02/06).
4Dissatisfaction is computed as the sum of the shares of respondents who declare that they disagree
or strongly disagree with the statement “Privatizations of state enterprises have been beneficial to the
country”. Unfortunately, the questions’ wording regarding satisfaction with privatizations was changed
in 2004, making comparisons diﬃcult.
5See La Porta and Lope´z-de-Silanes (1999), Megginson and Netter (2001), Kikeri and Nellis (2002)
inter alia.
6Note, however, that the timing of the privatization process is likely to be endogenous, still inducing
a selection bias (Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 2004).
7These papers are summarized and discussed in more details in Martimort and Straub (2005).
8See Davis, Ossowski, Richardson and Barnett (2000).
9Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2005), and McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003).
10McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003), Lora and Panizza (2002).
11Kikeri and Nellis (2002), McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003).
12Kikeri and Nellis (2002), Lo´pez-Calva and Rosello´n (2002), and La Porta and Lo´pez-de-Silanes (1999).
13Such as infant mortality in the case of water. More confirming evidence on welfare eﬀects is however
still necessary.
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prices, so that infrastructure services have been used as tax handle by governments. As
for employment, substantial initial job losses in the privatized firms were limited as a
percentage of the total workforce and tended to be (at least partially) reversed in the
medium run.14
Given this, there is little discussion that the relatively mixed balance on prices and
employment, because it did not have a clear negative welfare impact, is unlikely by itself
to explain the surge in discontent throughout the region. This suggests either a mas-
sive communication failure regarding the positive eﬀects of reforms, or that some of the
negative eﬀects that shape the public disapproval have gone unnoticed.
A dimension of the problem that has been largely overlooked though, when trying
to understand public perceptions of privatizations has to do with corruption and the
perceived transparency of the privatization process on the one hand, and the way resulting
gains and losses in terms of income distribution have aﬀected diﬀerent social groups.
While there is some evidence that petty corruption in the day-to-day operations of
former public utilities may have decreased as a consequence of privatization,15 in particular
because of better service coverage (less rationing), there is also a strong presumption that
grand-level corruption may have been fuelled by the privatization process. This could
seriously undermine its potential benefits by shifting the distribution of potential rents
and also by possibly modifying the actual composition of the reform process.16
It is important to note that, as the ownership structure is modified, the groups likely
to benefit from or to pay the cost of corruption change. As already noticed by Shleifer and
Vishny (1994), while taxpayers are likely to suﬀer the primary burden of political subsidies
and bribes under public ownership, the cost shifts to consumers of the specific services
with private ownership. These diﬀerent groups also have diﬀerent levels of organization,
homogeneity and costs of organizing themselves as active political actors. This in turn may
have an impact on how much they would invest in uncovering and controlling corruption
or, alternatively, on how much political pressure they would exert as constituencies.17
Moreover, the type of corrupt practices also changes in the process, from using SOEs
as soft money transfer schemes to favored groups, to allowing greater prices to capture
the benefits from increased eﬃciency. As corruption has consistently been ranked as a top
preoccupation in the region, these shifts in corruption patterns are likely to constitute an
14Kikeri and Nellis (2002) report that significant labor reductions are mainly observed in the sub-group
of non-competitive firms.
15See Clarke and Xu (2004).
16See Rose-Ackerman (1999), Estache (2004) and Martimort and Straub (2005), for a discussion of the
channels through which corruption may destroy the benefits from privatizations. These include among
others the use of inside information at the pre-award stage, renegotiations (Guasch, Laﬀont and Straub,
2003 and 2005; Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, 2003), and obstacles to the introduction of competition.
17See Olson (1971).
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important explanation of the massive upsurge in dissatisfaction with privatizations.
Our theory shows how the degree of corruption responds to changes in the ownership
structure of major public service providers. Our main conclusion is that there are cases
where private ownership, even though it fosters eﬃciency-enhancing investments also
opens the door to more corruption. In turn, public dissatisfaction towards privatization
is crucially aﬀected by this degree of corruption. More precisely, we shall argue that,
although public and private ownerships are both subject to corruption, these corrupt deals
are of diﬀerent kinds, have diﬀerent likelihoods in equilibrium, and might be perceived
quite diﬀerently by the general public. The important point we want to stress is that
corruption between non-benevolent public oﬃcials and the firm might emerge more easily,
precisely for the very reasons that make privatization socially beneficial, namely a harder
budget constraint due to restricted transfers between the State and the firm. A hardened
budget constraint under private ownership fosters investments but also shifts the burden
of corruption from taxpayers to consumers. Our model will thus explain a seemingly
paradoxical situation where both eﬃciency and investments are fostered and, at the same
time, corruption and dissatisfaction are more pronounced.
Let us see in more details how the ownership structure and the kinds of control rights
exerted by public oﬃcials aﬀect both the patterns of investment and corruption. Since Ko-
rnai (1986), it is by-now well known that public firms suﬀer from the so-called soft-budget
constraint. As an owner, the government cannot refrain from siphoning the Treasury to
cover the cost overruns of a public firm. Anticipating these extra subsidies, the managers
of public firms have little incentives to cut on costs. Under-investment in cost-reducing
infrastructure prevails under public ownership. The other consequence of allowing di-
rect transfers between the government and the public firms is that any kind of collusion
between public oﬃcials and the manager of the public firm takes the form of inflated
subsidies, which siphon the Treasury to please private interests. Those manipulations are
thus perceived as a burden only by taxpayers and do not appear significant to consumers.
On the other hand, it has often been argued that a key benefit of private ownership
comes from the fact that the government stays at arm’s length with the private firm. By
committing itself not to use lump-sum transfers to finance cost overruns, the government
hardens the firm’s budget constraint. This fosters cost-reducing investments and improves
welfare. Indeed, in the absence of public funds, the manager of a private firm can only
cover costs with the firm’s revenues. However, raising price mark-ups to cover ineﬃcient
fixed costs also dampens demand. Under a hard-budget constraint, consumers discipline
the firm. This increases incentives to realize cost-reducing investments. However, the
hidden side of this hard budget constraint is that collusion between public oﬃcials and
the firm takes now the form of softened price regulation. Consumers might be quite
sensitive to the corresponding price increases. The burden of corruption is thus quite
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diﬀerent under private ownership and, as a result, the extent to which society perceives
corruption changes with the ownership structure.
Literature Review: Our definition of ownership is standard. It relies on the unrestricted
exercise of residual rights of control, which stems from the ability to use transfers to
finance (or refinance) the firm under public ownership. This definition is thus the same
as in Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Bennedsen (2000). However, because it is based on
informational asymmetries to justify first the existing information rent of firms, second,
the discretion of public oﬃcials, our model provides solid micro-foundations for the stakes
of corruption. It does not a priori distinguish between the kinds of corruption which
respectively takes place between a private manager and a public oﬃcial or between a
public manager and a public oﬃcial as those previous studies. Any such diﬀerence comes
from the existing diﬀerences in incentives that arise under both governance modes.
Although the soft versus hard budget constraint debate has by-now been put on firmer
theoretical grounds,18 no one has to the best of our knowledge analyzed the consequences
of tightening the firm’s budget on the stakes and degrees of corruption that may emerge.
Our paper bears some similarity with Coate and Morris (1995), who argue that ineﬃcient
redistributive tools may be used to transfer resources towards private interests. A similar
phenomenon arises here: because it suppresses direct transfers from taxpayers to the
public firm, privatization may change the collusive stakes between the public oﬃcial and
the firm, sometimes increasing that stake and making corruption more likely. As we do
in this paper, Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 15) argued that average cost pricing
triggers more reaction from consumers in a model where the firm’s private information is
on its fixed cost and where collusion is not an equilibrium phenomenon.
Finally, the literature on privatization in developing countries, our primary concern,
has by large ignored the possibly positive relationship between investment, privatization
and corruption unveiled in our paper. On the relationship between privatization and
corruption, a few papers deal with diﬀerent aspects of the process.
At the theoretical level, Laﬀont (2005, Chapter 3) stresses instead that the mere fact
of privatizing may be a corrupt political act. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) develop
a model of privatization in which privatization helps controlling political discretion, and
introduce corrupt monetary transfers between managers and politicians as way to provide
benefits to the latter more eﬃciently than through excess employment for example, thus
arguing for a socially beneficial eﬀect of corruption. Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2005) propose a
model that explains how the privatization process in transition countries, because it was
plagued with corruption, failed to generate a high level of demand for the establishment
18See Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2002) and Segal (1999) for more
recent contributions.
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of the rule of law and led to an ineﬃcient path of institutional change.
At the empirical level, Kaufman and Siegelbaum (1997) consider the privatization
process that took place in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, and
discuss how the scope and diﬀerent methods employed to carry out privatization aﬀected
the likelihood of subsequent corruption. Clarke and Xu (2004) document how petty
corruption in eastern European and central Asian utilities depends on the characteristics
of bribe payers and takers, arguing in particular that corruption is lower with privatized
and competitive utilities. Finally, anecdotal evidence and case studies on the link between
privatization and corruption can be found in Manzetti (1999), Rose-Ackerman (1999) and
Tulchin and Espach (2000) inter alia.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model. Section
3 analyzes the benchmark of a benevolent public oﬃcial. We focus there on the benefits
of private ownership in hardening the firm’s budget constraint and its positive impact on
investment. Section 4 introduces the possibility of corruption and derives its consequences
both for public and private ownership. Section 5 discusses the incentives of consumers
to react to an increase in their own perception of corruption. Section 6 presents and
discusses stylized facts and estimations from surveys in Latin America supporting the
analysis put forward in the theoretical model. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are relegated
to an Appendix.
2 The Model
We investigate the impact of the ownership structure on the degree of corruption that
prevails in the economy. To distinguish between the objectives of society as a whole
and those of the potentially corrupt politician (decision-maker) in charge of designing
the firm’s regulation, we will use a three-tier model of incentive regulation, general pub-
lic/government/firm, along the lines of Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, Chapters 13 and follow-
ing).
¨ Ownership structures: We shall analyze two diﬀerent ownership structures:
• Public ownership: The decision-maker can use the general Treasury to make
monetary transfers to the firm.19 An incentive regulation of a public firm stipulates
both the value of these transfers and the firm’s output.
• Private ownership: No such direct transfers can be used. The private firm must
cover its costs from its revenue. Although private, the firm is still subject to some
19See Schleifer and Vishny (1994) for a similar assumption.
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regulation in the form of quantity/price restrictions, which aﬀects the firm’s revenue
and its ability to cover its fixed-cost.
The basic diﬀerence between public and private ownerships comes thus from the gov-
ernment’s inability to make direct transfers to the firm in the latter. This view is consistent
with the host of evidence on the so-called soft-budget constraint faced by public firms.
As an owner, the government cannot refrain from siphoning the general budget to cover
cost overruns of public firms. Instead, the government, when its sole role consists in regu-
lating a private firm, can no longer use the Treasury to increase the firm’s revenues.20 Of
course, this diﬀerence in the firm’s budget constraint also has implications on its ex ante
incentives to reduce fixed-cost. We shall address the implications of diﬀerent ownership
structures on investments in Section 3.
¨ Preferences: Let us turn to a description of the objective functions of each player.
Social welfare incorporates the utilities of consumers, taxpayers and shareholders of the
firm.21 It writes as:
W = S(q)− P (q)q − (1 + λ)(t+ s) + U + V, (1)
where S(q)−P (q)q is the consumers’ net surplus from consuming q units of the good, t is
the transfer from the general budget to the firm and U is the firm’s profit. S0(·) = P (·) is
the inverse demand function which is decreasing. The cost of public funds λ will play an
important role in the forthcoming analysis. It measures the extend of the government’s
budgetary problems.
The political decision-maker’s utility can be written as:
V = s ≥ 0, (2)
where s is the share of the overall budget that this decision-maker can grasp for himself.
The politician must of course obtain a positive utility from holding oﬃce.
One should not take too literally this term and view it only as the potential wage of
holding oﬃce that a public oﬃcial may secure. This may also stand for all the perquisites,
prestige, career concerns that the politician may have. Note also that including the
20Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) provide evidence of such a hardening of the budget constraint of
privatized firms in transition economies. Although ex post renegotiation of regulatory contracts, which
has been widespread in Latin America (Guasch, Laﬀont and Straub, 2003 and 2005), may to some extent
soften the budget constraint of the firm, the lags involved in the process still imply that private firms
face harder budget constraints than their public counterpart.
21In the case of a public firm, one can assume that shares are equally distributed among the public,
whereas only owners hold such shares in the case of private ownership. In both cases, the expression of
social welfare remains of course the same.
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politician’s utility into the social objective function may be warranted even though the
politician by himself is negligible. For instance, he may represent a group (tribe, interest
group, family with large economic stakes, etc.), whose interests follow closely his own and
are, at large, not negligible.
Once its investment I has already been sunk, the firm’s profit, whether private or
public, i.e., whether transfers are available or not, can be written as:
U = t+ P (q)q − θq −K(I), (3)
and we normalize at zero the firm’s ex post outside opportunities.
This profit is made of any direct transfer from the government, the firm’s revenue and
is net of the production cost. This entails a fixed-cost related to the size of an ex ante
investment I performed by the firm. This fixed-cost may for instance be viewed as the
cost of operating an electricity, telecommunication or water network. We will assume that
K 0(I) < 0 with K 00(I) > 0, so that a greater investment reduces the operating fixed-cost
and does so at an increasing rate.
In many privatization cases, operators face well defined investment obligations, linked
for example to the extension of the physical network. Without loss of generality, we
normalize the size of this contractible and verifiable investment to zero. The investment I
must therefore be understood as any additional “eﬃciency investment”, which we assume
is non-verifiable although observable by both parties.22 For instance, the government does
not have the ability to commit beforehand to any regulatory scheme. The non-verifiable
part of the firm’s investment is thus under the threat of regulatory hold-up.
For further references, it may be useful to rewrite social welfare once the firm’s transfer
has been substituted as
W = S(q) + λP (q)q − (1 + λ)(θq +K(I))− λ(U + V )− I.
¨ Information structure: Asymmetric information is a key-ingredient of our modeling
in two respects. First, it will justify the existence of information rents that the firm
may get from holding private information. These rents are the key engine of investment
under private ownership.23 Second, the desire to keep those rents also creates a motive
for capturing the politician and having him exert discretion to favor the firm rather than
the general public.
Following the so-called New Regulatory Economics,24 we will assume that the firm has
private information on its marginal cost parameter θ. For simplicity, we adopt a simple
22This observability is a standard assumption in the incomplete contract literature, see Hart (1995).
23See Riordan (1990) and Schmidt (1996) for similar arguments.
24See Laﬀont (1994).
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discrete framework. This eﬃciency parameter may only take two values, θ ∈ Θ = {θ, θ¯},
with respective probabilities ν and 1− ν.
Bridging this information gap between the firm and the rest of society, which remains
uninformed, the politician observes a hard information signal σ ∈ Σ = {θ, ∅} with respec-
tive probabilities νε and 1 − νε. The firm and the politician both know σ. By hiding
evidence that the firm is eﬃcient, the politician may thus let the firm enjoy some rent.
This discretion opens the door to the possibility that the politician get corrupted.
¨ Corruption: We shall assume that when the firm oﬀers x dollars of bribes to the
politician, the latter enjoys only a fraction kx of this amount. The non-negative parameter
k ≤ 1 thus reflects the eﬃciency of collusive side-deals. This parameter captures the
extent to which norms of collusive behavior can easily be sustained or not, the degree of
“corruption culture” that prevails in a society, the more or less important psychological
costs that the public oﬃcial might incur when being corrupted, the ineﬃciency that may
be associated to non-monetary means of bribes between collusive partners, etc.25
We shall assume that k is drawn according to a CDF F (·) with everywhere positive
density f(·) on [0, 1]. Moreover, the following monotone hazard rate property is assumed
to hold:
d
dk
µ
F (k)
f(k)
¶
> 0.
The collusion technology is known to both the firm and the politician but not to the
general public.
It is important to stress that the randomness of k renders invalid the Collusion-
Proofness Principle.26 For a given regulatory contract, which determines the possible
stake of collusion between the politician and the firm, collusion may or may not happen
depending on the prevailing technology. If the wage received when behaving and reporting
socially valuable information exceeds the benefits of colluding, collusion does not occur
and vice-versa. With the technology for side-contracting being common knowledge, rais-
ing the public oﬃcial’s wage above these collusive benefits would be enough to always
prevent collusion.27 However, when the benefits from colluding are uncertain as assumed
here, raising that wage above the maximal benefit corresponding to the extreme value
k = 1 is certainly too costly. When k = 1, society finds it as costly to give up informa-
tion rent to the regulated firm than to pay a regulator to bridge the informational gap.
25See Faure-Grimaud, Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) for further motivations behind this parameter.
26See Tirole (1986) for a proof of this Principle in the case where the technology for side-contracting
is common knowledge. Tirole (1992) also analyzed a model where the collusion technology k is unknown
but may take only two values. He showed that collusion may be an equilibrium phenomenon when the
eﬃcient technology of collusion is unlikely. An example with a continuous support is also developed in
Auriol (2006).
27See again Tirole (1986, and 1992).
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Instead, slightly reducing this wage induces some equilibrium corruption for the most ef-
ficient collusive technologies while corruption is still prevented for the least eﬃcient ones.
Moreover, doing so also reduces the budgetary burden of those wages. Hence, allowing
some corruption in equilibrium is always optimal.
The timing of the game is in Figure 2.
-
The ownership
structure
is chosen.
The firm
chooses the size
of its investment
I.
The regulatory
contract
is designed
Collusion between
the firm and
the politician
(if any) takes place
Transfers
and output are
realized
time
Figure 2: Timing.
From the Revelation Principle,28 the most general class of contracts, which are feasible
given the information structure is of the formn
s(θˆ, σˆ); t(θˆ, σˆ); q(θˆ, σˆ)
o
θˆ∈Θ, σˆ∈Σ
,
where θˆ is the firm’s report on its cost and σˆ is the politician’s report on the signal he
has got on the firm’s cost. For the sake of simplifying notations, we will denote such a
contract ©
(s∗, t∗, q∗); (s, t, q); (s¯, t¯, q¯)
ª
,
where (s∗, t∗, q∗) are respectively the politician benefits from holding oﬃce, the firm’s
transfer and its output when σ = θ (and thus θ = θ). (s, t, q) and (s¯, t¯, q¯) are the same
variables when σ = ∅ and respectively θ = θ and θ = θ¯. Similar notations are used for
the firm’s profit U∗, U and U¯ in each state of nature.
3 Benchmark: Benevolent Politician
A benevolent politician uses any piece of private information he may have learned on the
firm to maximize social welfare and does not need to be paid any positive wage for doing
so. Alternatively, with a benevolent politician, everything happens as if the eﬃciency of
collusive deals k was identically null.
28See Green and Laﬀont (1977), Myerson (1979) and Laﬀont and Martimort (2002).
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¨ Public Ownership: When σ = θ is observed and reported by the politician, the firm
enjoys a profit
U∗ = t∗ + (P (q∗)− θ)q∗ −K(I) ≥ 0. (4)
When the uninformative signal σ = ∅ is instead observed by the politician, a regulatory
mechanism is incentive-feasible when it satisfies the following incentive and participation
constraints:
U = t+ (P (q)− θ)q −K(I) ≥ t¯+ (P (q¯)− θ)q¯ −K(I) = U¯ +∆θq¯, (5)
U¯ = t¯+ (P (q¯)− θ¯)q¯ −K(I) ≥ 0. (6)
In two-types adverse selection problems as the present one where transfers are allowed,
it is standard to show that only the eﬃcient firm’s incentive constraint and the ineﬃcient
one’s participation constraint are relevant.29
The optimal regulation with a benevolent politician under public ownership is sum-
marized in the next proposition:
Proposition 1 : Under public ownership and with a benevolent politician, the optimal
outputs are respectively given by the following Ramsey formula:
? For an eﬃcient firm, qB
Pu
= q∗B
Pu
, such that
P
³
qB
Pu
´
− θ = − λ
1 + λ
P 0
³
qB
Pu
´
qB
Pu
; (7)
? For an ineﬃcient firm,
P
³
qB
Pu
´
−
µ
θ¯ +
ν(1− ε)
1− ν
λ
1 + λ
∆θ
¶
= − λ
1 + λ
P 0
¡
q¯BPu
¢
q¯BPu. (8)
Only the eﬃcient firm gets an information rent when σ = ∅. This rent does not depend
on its ex ante investment:
UBPu = ∆θq¯
B
Pu > 0, and U¯
B
Pu = U
∗B
Pu = 0. (9)
The public firm does not invest, IBPu = 0.
29See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 2). In particular incentive constraints imply the standard
monotonicity conditions q ≥ q¯. We will see below that, when transfers are not allowed (i.e., the firm
is private), even the ineﬃcient firm’s incentive constraint matters since only pooling mechanisms are
possible (q = q¯).
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Outputs follow traditional Ramsey formulas in this model with costly public funds.
However, because of asymmetric information, the true cost of an ineﬃcient firm θ¯ must
now be replaced by its virtual cost θ¯ + ν(1−ε)
1−ν
λ
1+λ
∆θ, which is obviously greater. This
reduces the output of an ineﬃcient firm but also, and this is the benefit of doing so, the
information rent that an eﬃcient one gets.
Importantly, the rent of the eﬃcient firm does not depend on its investment under
public ownership. Indeed, any reduction in the fixed-cost that such investment would
trigger is passed on to the taxpayers under public ownership. Those taxpayers reduce by
the same amount the taxes they would pay to cover the firm’s cost and have the firm at
least break even. Nothing of this cost reduction is passed on to the firm itself, which thus
does not internalize any of its investment. There is a complete dichotomy between the
output decision, which depends only on variable costs, and the investment decision. In
other words, under public ownership the source of the firm’s information rent lies in its
marginal cost only and the firm’s incentives to invest are unrelated to its rent.
Because he cannot refrain from using those transfers and cannot commit to reward
the investment, which is non-verifiable, the politician is unable to induce any investment
from the public firm.30
¨ Private ownership: Under private ownership, transfers are no longer feasible. The
number of instruments, which can be used for screening purposes is thus reduced. As a
result, only pooling mechanisms stipulating a constant output q¯ = q are available when
the politician is uninformed, i.e., when σ = ∅. Of course, an optimal regulation can still
set a diﬀerent output q∗ when the politician is informed (σ = θ).
Proposition 2 : Under private ownership and a benevolent regulator, the optimal out-
puts are function of the investment I and are respectively given by the following formula:
? For σ = θ,
P
³
q∗B
Pr
(I)
´
− θ = − λ
∗(I)
1 + λ∗(I)
P 0
³
q∗B
Pr
(I)
´
q∗B
Pr
(I), (10)
where λ∗(I) is strictly decreasing in I and determined by the zero-profit condition
P
³
q∗B
Pr
(I)
´
= θ +
K(I)
q∗B
Pr
(I)
; (11)
? For σ = ∅, q¯BPr = qBPr such that
P
¡
q¯BPr(I)
¢
− θ¯ = − λ˜(I)
1 + λ˜(I)
P 0
¡
q¯BPr(I)
¢
q¯BPr(I), (12)
30This accords with general empirical findings, mentioned in the Introduction, that privatized firms
become more eﬃcient than their initial public counterparts.
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where λ˜(I) is strictly decreasing in I and determined by the zero-profit condition for
an ineﬃcient firm
P
¡
q¯BPr(I)
¢
− θ¯ = K(I)
q¯BPr(I)
. (13)
Only the eﬃcient firm gets an information rent
UBPr = ∆θq¯
B
Pr(I), and U
∗B
Pr = U¯
B
Pr = 0. (14)
The firm invests a positive amount IBPr given by:
ν(1− ε)∆θ∂q¯
B
∂I
(IBPr) = 1. (15)
The intuition behind this Proposition is straightforward. When regulatory transfers
are banned, the only way that the firm’s budget constraint can be satisfied is by decreasing
output, raising the price mark-up (equations (10) and (12)) so that revenues cover the
fixed-cost. Of course, doing so is easier and requires less output distortion when the
fixed-cost itself is small enough (from a technical viewpoint the multipliers of the binding
zero-profit constraints decrease in I). Output distortions, and thus the rent that an
eﬃcient firm gets, are now directly linked to the size of the investment. This desire
for securing enough rent ex post whenever the benevolent political remains uninformed
creates the firm’s ex ante incentives to invest. Private ownership comes with a harder
budget constraint and greater ex ante investment.31
4 Corruption
Let us now consider the case of a non-benevolent politician who can thus be corrupted
by the industry. Contrary to most of the existing literature on capture,32 we assume
that there exists a whole distribution of non-benevolent politicians, who diﬀer in terms
of their willingness to collude with private interests, or to put it diﬀerently, in terms of
the transaction costs of collusive behavior that they face when engaging in side-deals.
This assumption ensures that corruption is always an equilibrium phenomenon; i.e., at
31Although this result has the flavor of those found in Riordan (1990), Schmidt (1996) and Faure-
Grimaud (2001), it should also be contrasted with those papers along several lines. In our model,
the diﬀerence between the ownership structures comes from the diﬀerent contracting abilities of the
government as an owner and the government as a simple regulator, not from diﬀerences in the information
structures as is assumed (in the first two pieces) or derived (in the last one) in these works. Although
our analysis could be put on the firmer foundations used in those models, it does not seem useful for our
current purposes. Also, investment in the previous literature aﬀects the distribution of marginal cost,
not the fixed-cost as here.
32See Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 15) for instance. A noticeable exception is Auriol (2006).
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the social optimum, there is always some positive probability that the public oﬃcial is
corrupted.
To see that point formally, observe that the stake of corruption in our model is the
rent ∆θq¯i (i ∈ {Pu, Pr}) that the firm can secure whenever the informed politician
(σ = θ) reports instead having observed nothing (σˆ = ∅). Whenever his benefits of doing
so exceed the gains ∆θq¯i from being corrupted, the politician reports publicly the hard
information signal on the firm being eﬃcient and pockets the corresponding reward s∗i .
This occurs with probability
Pr
n
k˜∆θq¯i ≤ s∗i
o
= F
µ
s∗i
∆θq¯i
¶
.
Instead, when the collusion technology is suﬃciently eﬃcient, namely when k˜∆θq¯i >
s∗i , the politician hides evidence on the type of the firm and prefers to accept its favor
rather than behaving.
When corruption is possible, we may write expected welfare under any ownership
regime i (i ∈ {Pu, Pr}) as:
E
(θ,σ)
(Wi) = νεF
µ
s∗i
∆θq¯i
¶³
S(q∗
i
)− θq∗
i
− λ(t∗i + s∗i )
´
+νε
Z 1
s∗
i
∆θq¯i
³
S(q
i
)− θq
i
− λti + (k˜ − 1)∆θq¯i
´
f(k˜)dk
+ν(1− ε)
³
S(q
i
)− θq
i
− λti
´
+(1− ν)
¡
S(q¯i)− θ¯q¯i − λt¯i
¢
−K(Ii)− Ii, (16)
where E
(θ,σ)
(·) is the expectation operator and Ii represents the investment under the cor-
responding ownership structure.
The diﬀerent terms on the right-hand side of (16) can be readily interpreted. The first
term represents the expected welfare given that the politician is informed but corruption
does not take place because the transaction technology is ineﬃcient enough. Because
of the cost of public funds, transferring money either to the politician or to the firm is
costly. The second term represents expected social welfare when collusion does occur
on the equilibrium path. The politician gives up any wage he may receive and prefers
bribes. Because bribes are ineﬃcient ways of transferring wealth, there is a dead-weight
loss of corruption (the term (k˜−1)∆θq¯i < 0) which is a cost of corruption. The third and
fourth terms are easily interpreted as the expected welfare when the politician remains
uninformed.
This expression shows that, whenever corruption occurs, the politician enjoys the
benefits k˜∆θq¯i and the firm, when public, receives a transfer ti from the general budget
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even though the signal σ learned by the politician is informative. In that case, we assume
that the politician has all the bargaining power in negotiating bribes with the firm, which
therefore gets no rent.33 Note also that, when corruption is an equilibrium phenomenon,
the regulatory scheme is still designed to induce information revelation from the firm, but
of course, this is costly in terms of information rent left to the firm and finally pocketed
(at least partially) by the politician.
The optimal incentive regulation with corruption must maximize (16) subject to the
incentive and participation constraints (4) to (6). Of particular importance is the op-
timization with respect to s∗i , the politician’s wage. To understand the corresponding
first-order condition, it is useful to stress two diﬀerent eﬀects of raising s∗i . On the one
hand, raising s∗i indeed increases the probability that the politician prefers not to be
corrupted. On the other hand, doing so is of course socially costly.
To better understand this optimization, let us define k∗i =
s∗i
∆θq¯i as a new optimization
variable, which replaces s∗i . k
∗
i is a threshold in the eﬃciency of the collusive technologies,
above which corruption occurs in equilibrium. The corresponding first-order condition
with respect to k∗i becomes:
34nh
S(q∗
i
)− θq∗
i
− (S(q
i
)− θq
i
)
i
+∆θq¯i − λ[t∗i − ti]− (1 + λ)k∗i∆θq¯i
o
f(k∗i ) = λF (k
∗
i )∆θq¯i.
(17)
This condition can be simplified further by using the property of the optimal regulatory
contract in each ownership regime. This is the task to which we now turn.
4.1 Public Ownership
Consider first the case of public ownership. Two remarks are in order. First, Proposition 1
shows that production is first-best, i.e., q
Pu
= q∗
Pu
at the optimal contract if the politician
is benevolent. It is easy to check that this condition still holds if the politician is corrupt-
ible.35 Second, still using the fact that (4) and (5) are binding at the optimal contract,
the diﬀerence between the firm’s transfers when its type is reported by the politician and
when it is not is given by:
tPu − t∗Pu = ∆θq¯Pu.
33This assumption is without loss of generality and we could allow for a diﬀerent distribution of the
bargaining surplus. Note that empirically, politicians indeed seem to have captured the bulk of eﬃciency
gains to the detriment of firms and, of course, consumers (see Estache, Guasch and Trujillo, 2003).
34This condition is also suﬃcient thanks to the monotonicity of the hazard rate, which ensures quasi-
concavity with respect to k∗i .
35See the Appendix for details.
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Intuitively, when the politician is not corrupted but remains informed, he helps society
to extract the eﬃcient firm’s rent ∆θq¯Pu. This reduces the burden of incentive regulation
on taxpayers by the same amount.
Finally, using the two remarks above helps simplifying (17) to get that k∗Pu solves:
k∗Pu +
λ
1 + λ
F
f
(k∗Pu)
(k∗Pu)
= 1. (18)
Because the monotone hazard rate property holds, the left-hand side of (18) is strictly
increasing and this equation admits a unique solution in ]0, 1[ so that corruption is always
an equilibrium phenomenon.
Proposition 3 : The probability of corruption 1− F (k∗Pu) is always positive with public
ownership and it increases with the cost of public funds λ.
As λ increases, fighting corruption by raising s∗Pu becomes increasingly costly from a
social viewpoint. It is then preferable to let more corruption occur at equilibrium. This
comparative statics points at an interesting aspect of the analysis. Developing countries
characterized by a large cost of public funds, because of large public deficits or highly
distortionary and ineﬃcient tax systems, are also likely to face a high level of corruption
under public ownership. International agencies have often pushed the view that such
countries should rely more on the private sector to undertake major investments in in-
frastructure. As we will point out below in more details, this may not be warranted, as
corruption will still be present under private ownership and its scope will depend on the
economic characteristics of the privatized sector.
The other impact of corruption is that it changes the firm’s output and the distribution
of rents, without nevertheless aﬀecting the incentives to invest.
Proposition 4 : Under public ownership and with a corruptible politician, the eﬃcient
firm always produces eﬃciently qc
Pu
= q∗c = qB
Pu
, whereas the ineﬃcient firm output
becomes:
P (q¯cPu)−
µ
θ¯ +
λν
(1 + λ)(1− ν)
µ
1 + ε
µ
1
λ
Z 1
k∗
(1− k˜)f(k˜)dk˜ − F (k∗)(1− k∗)
¶¶¶
=
−λ
1 + λ
P 0(q¯cPu)q¯
c
Pu. (19)
Only the eﬃcient firm obtains a rent U cPu = ∆θq¯
c
pu, which does not depend on the
investment level, so that the public firm still has no incentives to invest and IcPu = 0.
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Everything happens as if the virtual cost parameter of an ineﬃcient firm were now
given by the following expression
θ¯ +
λ
(1 + λ)
ν
(1− ν)
µ
1 + ε
µ
1
λ
Z 1
k∗
(1− k˜)f(k˜)dk˜ − F (k∗)(1− k∗)
¶¶
∆θ.
Compared with the case of a benevolent politician, this virtual cost is of course greater.
This captures the fact that now distortions are also necessary to reduce the cost for society
of having an informed but non-benevolent politician. Those additional distortions have
two sources. First, they come from the fact that a non-negative and socially costly wage
(s∗ = k∗∆θq¯cPu) is given to the politician to ensure that he behaves at least when the
technology of collusion is suﬃciently ineﬃcient, i.e., with probability F (k∗); a greater
output increases the firm’s information rent and would require to raise the wage of the
politician beyond the eﬃcient level. Second, these distortions are also necessary when
the technology of collusion is eﬃcient enough. In that case, the informed politician is
corrupted so that he does not reveal information. Society has to give up some information
rent to the firm for inducing this information revelation. However, and this is a side-eﬀect
of corruption being an equilibrium phenomenon, this rent ends up being pocketed by the
corrupted politician and this brings an extra cost under the form of a deadweight loss of
collusion (the term
R 1
k∗(1− k˜)f(k˜)dk˜ in the expression of the virtual cost parameter).
Finally note that, even with corruption, the public firm’s expected rent does not
depend on its investment, so that again public ownership goes hand in hand with some
underinvestment.
4.2 Private Ownership
With private ownership, transfers can no longer be used and the optimal regulation entails
some pooling when no informative signal is revealed by the politician (σ = ∅), namely
q∗ > q = q¯.
Condition (17) can now be simplified to get the new expression of the cut-oﬀ:
k∗Pr +
λ
1 + λ
F (k∗Pr)
f(k∗Pr)
=
S(q∗
Pr
)− θq∗
Pr
− [S(q¯Pr)− θ¯q¯Pr]
(1 + λ)∆θq¯Pr
. (20)
Again q∗
Pr
and q¯Pr take the same values defined in (10) to (13), i.e. just helping the firm
to cover its fixed-cost in each state of nature.
To better understand (20) and compare it with (18), let us assume that ∆θ is small
enough. In that case, the multipliers of the firm’s break-even constraints λ∗(I) and λ˜(I),
when the politician is informed and when he is not respectively, are close to each other.
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The following approximation holds:36
k∗Pr +
λ
1 + λ
F (k∗Pr)
f(k∗Pr)
≈ 1 + λ˜(I)
1 + λ
< 1 ⇔ λ˜(I) < λ. (21)
This gives immediately:
Proposition 5 : Assume that ∆θ is small enough, then the probability of corruption
1−F (k∗Pr) under private ownership is larger than the probability of corruption 1−F (k∗Pu)
under public ownership if and only if λ˜(I) > λ.
To understand the intuition behind this proposition, note that, under private owner-
ship, the gains from having a non-corrupted politician are no longer pocketed by taxpayers
but by consumers, who pay a lower price for the firm’s output when it is eﬃcient and
the politician is informed. For ∆θ small enough this gain on the consumers’ surplus can
be approximated by (1 + λ˜(I))∆θq¯Pr. This is nothing else that the information rent of
an eﬃcient firm conveniently weighted by a factor 1 + λ˜(I) to capture the impact that a
truthful report of the politician has on hardening the eﬃcient firm’s break-even constraint.
As the firm’s investment decreases and breaking even becomes harder, the multiplier
λ˜(I) increases. By the same token, the probability of corruption increases as well. This
points to a negative correlation between investment and corruption under private owner-
ship.37
However, our model is consistent with the possibility that a positive investment under
private ownership also comes with more corruption than under public ownership. Indeed,
when the cost of public funds λ is not too large, for instance because the government’s
deficit is small or because the taxation system is relatively eﬃcient, the probability of
corruption under public ownership is small. It can be made even smaller than under
private ownership.
To understand the impact of the ownership structure on corruption, first note that
transferring one more dollar from society, and most specifically taxpayers, to a politician
in order to prevent corruption has a cost 1+λ on the general budget of the State, where λ is
the cost of public funds. This extra dollar prevents the public firm from siphoning public
funds at the same rate. Instead, under private ownership, public funds can no longer
be siphoned that way. Consumers now bear the cost of corruption in terms of higher
prices. The transfer of wealth from society, and now more specifically from consumers,
to the politician has a cost 1+ λ˜(I) where λ˜(I) is actually the shadow cost of the private
36See the Appendix for details.
37Dal Bo and Rossi (2003) provide evidence of a negative correlation between eﬃciency and corruption
for the electricity sector in Latin America. Estache (2004) reviews additional references from South Asia,
Africa and Eastern Europe.
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firm’s budget constraint, which, of course, depends on its investment I. However, fighting
corruption by raising the wage of the public oﬃcials still requires to withdraw 1+λ from
the State’s budget.
Comparisons between the two diﬀerent ownership structures in terms of corruption
follow immediately. When λ˜(I) < λ, there is less equilibrium corruption under private
ownership than under public ownership. It becomes relatively diﬃcult to transfer re-
sources for corrupted activities and fighting them is comparatively easier. Instead, when
λ˜(I) > λ, private ownership also generates more corruption. The degree of equilibrium
corruption is greater when eﬃciency and investments are themselves greater.
Our model also predicts that a shift towards private ownership may thus increase
corruption when λ˜(I) is larger than λ. This is likely to be the case for regulated sectors
which, when public, enjoyed large subsidies from the rest of the economy, or sectors which
involve large fixed-costs and require significant output distortions and large mark-ups to
help private firms break-even. This indicates when the paradoxical situation in which
investment and increased corruption go hand in hand is more likely to prevail. Sectors
like water and transport are typical candidates for that paradox since they tend to be
net recipients of transfers from the state38 and involve large sunk investments. These
are also sectors that typically remain non-competitive, making corruption through price
manipulation easier in the absence of any kind of benchmarking.39
For completeness, let us analyze the impact of corruption on outputs and investment
in the case of private ownership. Looking at (16) in the case where transfers are banned
and outputs q and q¯ are pooled together, we observe that outputs and investments are
unchanged. The only role of corruption is to make it more likely that an eﬃcient firm
produces q¯BPr(I) instead of q
∗B
Pr
(I).
Both when the politician is not corrupted and reports publicly this information and
when he is corrupted and pockets the rent for himself, the private firm is expropriated
by the politician from the rent it may get in state σ = θ. This reduces the benefits of
investing for the private firm (term 1− ε) and yields the same investment level as with a
benevolent politician.
Summarizing, we get:
Proposition 6 : Under private ownership and with a corruptible politician, outputs are
again only defined by the firm’s break-even conditions, so that formula (10) to (13) still
hold. The investment remains unchanged and is still equal to its value with a benevolent
38See Guasch, Laﬀont and Straub (2003).
39Of course, the speed at which competition is introduced is then determined simultaneously with
corruption, as argued on the basis of case studies by Manzetti (1999) and Rose-Ackerman (1999).
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politicial:
IcPr = I
c
Pr.
5 The Perception of Corruption
We have established so far conditions under which a shift to private ownership of a major
public service provider may increase the incidence of corruption. In this section, we
discuss how the cost of this corruption aﬀects diﬀerent social groups and how this may
shape their evaluation of the process. Interest groups may form as eﬀective watchdogs
and reduce the likelihood of corruption through diﬀerent channels. They may themselves
gather information and make it available to the general public. They may also induce
more coverage by medias of instances of misbehavior by public oﬃcials. Individuals can
react to what they think are high prices due to corruption by voting against tenured
politicians if they expect higher utility levels under alternative and uncorrupted political
regimes.
We will argue that the firm’s ownership structure has important implications for the
political reactions of both individuals and interest groups faced with the threat of corrupt
activities.
Both individuals’ and groups’ incentives to react to corruption are of course related
to the per-capita stake of doing so as well as to various transaction or psychological
costs. Following an insight due to Olson (1971), corruption might become less likely
when small, homogeneous, less disperse interest groups facing lower transaction costs of
organizing themselves intervene. For individuals, acting politically against the threat of
corruption might necessitate investing in education and information to understand the
terms of the political debate and the basic trends at play. In any case, various factors
may influence the incentives of both interest groups and individuals to have a disciplinary
eﬀect on presumed corrupted politicians.
For the purpose of our discussion, it is useful to distinguish the exogenous versus
endogenous determinants of these incentives. On the one hand, individuals in a given
population might be diﬀerentiated according to a number of exogenous aspects, including
in particular their income level and their geographical location. On the other hand, the
economic stakes of diﬀerent individuals are endogenously determined in our model by the
diﬀerence in ownership structures and thus regulatory policies.
To capture more formally the role of groups and individuals (excluded consumers,
served consumers, taxpayers) as disciplinary devices for corrupted politicians, we will
assume that they may react ex post, i.e., once the politician has already reported σˆ = ∅,
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to check whether that report is truthful or not. Depending on whether unorganized
individuals or better organized interest groups are concerned, this reaction might take
diﬀerent forms, from not voting for incumbents to a greater involvement in political life
and lobbying campaigns against corruption. All those political actions represent the
actual level of discontent that society may face in front of the presumption of a corrupted
economic life. At this stage, we do not need to be too explicit about the disciplinary role
that individuals/interest groups may exert on corruptible politicians.40 Formally, let us
denote by xji the probability that a group/individual j gets concerned about the likelihood
of corruption in ownership regime i. This probability should be a function of its stake Sji
in correcting the politician’s misbehavior, namely:
xji = G
j(Sji ).
with GjS > 0 and G
j(0) = 0. This function Gj(·) itself depends on the group/individual
j to capture some fundamental heterogeneity across them.
As a change in ownership occurs, the probability that diﬀerent groups/individuals
react to corruption changes. For instance, taxpayers are by definition inactive under
private ownership since regulated transfers are banned. Instead, they might perceive
corruption under public ownership since such corruption increases the burden of taxation
for taxpayers. This is the reverse for consumers, who are more prone to perceive corruption
when they face a high price for the service. The respective assessment of the benefits of
the privatization process for those diﬀerent groups can then be viewed as the diﬀerence
∆xj = xjPu−x
j
Pr, which encapsulates how the privatization process aﬀects the incentives to
react of the concerned constituency (maybe through an impact on access, prices, quality,
etc.).
Let us now illustrate in more details how taxpayers and consumers may perceive
diﬀerently the shift from public to private ownership. First, observe that, under public
ownership, only taxpayers may suﬀer from the possible corruption of the politician, which
takes the form of increased transfers and thus a higher tax burden. On the other hand,
whether oﬃcials are corrupted or not, an eﬃcient firm must be paid enough transfer to
reveal information but its output remains eﬃcient, so consumers have no incentives to
react to corruption because their net surplus remains the same whether σˆ = θ or σˆ = ∅
and θˆ = θ. As such, corruption is not perceived by consumers.
More precisely, under public ownership, the taxpayers’ stake StaxpayersPu for intervening
and checking potential corrupt behavior is given by the diﬀerence between what they
pay in case the politician is corrupted and information revelation has to be induced from
the firm itself and what they would pay in terms of wages to the politician in case the
40See nevertheless the Appendix where we develop a bare-boned model of such a disciplinary role in
the case where consumers are organized as eﬃcient watchdogs.
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politician chooses not to be corrupted. This yields the following expression:
StaxpayersPu = νε
Z 1
k∗Pu
(tPu − (t∗Pu + s∗Pu))f(k˜)dk˜ = νε∆θq¯Pu(1− k∗Pu)(1− F (k∗Pu)).
Note that this stake increases with the probability of corruption under public ownership,
i.e., when the taxation system is suﬃciently ineﬃcient. Taxpayers are more likely to
perceive the cost of corruption under public ownership when the cost of public funds is
large. To the extent that taxpayers represent a minor, wealthier share of society (which
is the case in most Latin American countries) and that an increase in the tax burden
due to corruption can be easily disguised as coming from deteriorating macroeconomic
conditions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), the quantity ∆xtaxpayers = Gtaxpayers(StaxpayerPu ) is
likely to be small. Even if it is significant, this quantity remains positive, showing that
taxpayers enjoy a shift towards private ownership and, as such, are not likely to express
any discontent.41
Under private ownership, corruption is more easily readable by the general public,
who, as consumers, might observe a significant price increase and may suspect from that
the existing corruption. The consumer’s expected stake for reacting to the threat of
corruption under private ownership is now given by:
SconsumersPr = νε(1− F (k∗Pr))(S(q∗Pr)− P (q
∗
Pr
)q∗
Pr
− (S(q¯Pr)− P (q¯Pr)q¯Pr))
where 1− F (k∗Pr) is the probability of corruption under private ownership and q¯Pr is the
output level given this level of corruption.
Corruption is likely to weight heavily on the public’s perception of the privatization
process when consumers of the public service represents a sizeable share of society. Specif-
ically, the quantity ∆xconsumers = −Gconsumers(StaxpayerPr ) is more likely to be significant
and, in any case, is negative.42 This points to the fact that consumers are more likely to
express their discontent as ownership shifts to the private sector. Our model thus shows
that while the increase in corruption is likely to be linked to a general increase in dissat-
isfaction, the changing pattern of corruption implies that this increase will be stronger
among the middle class, both because of their exogenous characteristics and because they
are the big losers in the biased distribution of eﬃciency gains.
41Since Gtaxpayers(StaxpayersPr ) = 0. Note that they still might express some discontent to the extent
that they are consumers as well.
42Here again, Gconsumers(SconsumersPu ) = 0.
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6 Stylized Facts and Discussion
We have shown that a shift towards private ownership of key regulated industries is likely
to result in a situation characterized by both increased eﬃciency and more corruption,
and by a higher level of discontent among middle class consumers. In what follows, we
present supportive stylized facts documenting the link between corruption, the perception
thereof, and the public expressions of distrust toward the benefits of privatization.
Figures 3 and 4 present simple scatter plots of changes in the degree of dissatisfaction
with privatization over the period 1998-2003 versus either the change or the absolute level
of a corruption index.43 The correlation coeﬃcients are -0.58 and -0.51 respectively.
Figure 3: Correlation between changes in dissatisfaction with privatizations and changes
in corruption, 1998-2003.
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43Dissatisfaction figures are from Latinobarometro (see footnote 4). The corruption index used is from
Political Risk Service. The scale goes from 0 to 6, with a higher score denoting less corruption. Note
that in the Latin American sample, between 1998 and 2003, average corruption actually increased by two
thirds of the 1998 standard deviation.
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Figure 4: Correlation between changes in dissatisfaction with privatizations, 1998-
2003, and corruption, 2003.
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These correlations are consistent with a wealth of anecdotal evidence on the long tra-
dition of corruption that has plagued Latin American economic policy making, especially
when it comes to the sale of public firms.44 In many cases, like the corruption scandal
that resulted in the eviction of the Brazilian president Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992
or the revelation on some of the deals made under the Menem presidency in Argentina,
the whole privatization process came under suspicion and this created a deep public dis-
trust in this type of policy intervention and in market reforms more generally. Moreover,
anti-privatization lobbies often capitalized on such cases, thus giving high visibility to the
issue.
Although these correlations do of course not establish a causal link between the feeling
that corruption has increased, or has not been addressed properly, and the dissatisfaction
with privatization, it is possible to further document the relationship between both in the
respondents’ answer to the successive surveys. First, note that corruption is consistently
perceived as a major issue by respondents across Latin America. In 1998, 94.9% overall
(96% in 2000) consider it to be a serious or very serious problem.45
As for the link between perceptions, in 2003, people were asked whether they consid-
ered that progress was made in reducing corruption.46 Dissatisfaction with privatization
44See for example Manzetti (1999) and Tulchin and Espach (2000).
45The question was not included again in this form in later surveys.
46People were asked whether there had been a lot/some/little or no progress.
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is higher among those answering that no or little progress was made (71.2% and 69.5%
respectively), than among more optimistic respondents considering that some or a lot of
progress was made (60.3% and 58.5% respectively). Thus, a similar pattern is obtained
using individual survey answers on corruption rather than country level subjective indices.
Moreover, perceptions of corruption are linked to the political economy of the process
and the shifts that privatizations induce in the distribution of costs and benefits. Indeed,
another striking figure coming out of opinion polls is the fact that the middle class is in
general more critical of privatization than any other group. Looking at education lev-
els, Latinobarometro data show that dissatisfaction is stronger among those with some
secondary or technical education than among the groups with either no education or com-
plete college education and that, from 1998 to 2003, the biggest increase in dissatisfaction
with privatizations was recorded for groups with intermediate education levels (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Dissatisfaction with privatizations by level of education
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60%
65%
70%
75%
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15%
17%
19%
21%
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27%
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1998 2003 Change 1998-2003 (right scale)
Levels of education: 1.= illiterate; 2 Basic incomplete; 3 = Basic complete; 4 = Secondary, medium, technical incomplete; 5 = Secondary,
media, technical complete; 6 = Superior incomplete; 7 = Superior complete.
Source: Latinobarometro 1998 and 2003.
Finally, for the groups that express the highest levels of dissatisfaction and have in-
creased their criticisms the most, we also observe strong correlation coeﬃcients across
countries between these changes in dissatisfaction and the changes in corruption, mean-
ing again that the correlation observed in Figures 3 and 4 above are mainly driven by
dissatisfaction among the middle class (Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Correlation coeﬃcients between changes dissatisfaction and in corruption
Correlation coefficients between changes in dissatisfaction and 
changes in corruption 1998-2003
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Source: Latinobarometro 1998 and 2003
Simple estimation results further support these stylized facts. Table 1 presents results
from ordered probit estimations based on the individual answers to the Latinobarometro
survey between 1998 and 2003. The dependent variable is the degree of satisfaction with
privatizations expressed by respondents. For the sake of conciseness we present only the
results for the explanatory variables relevant to our analysis, i.e. corruption and the
level of education, while indicating the other types of control variables included in the
analysis. In all cases, year and country dummies are included. In columns 2 to 4, we add
individual characteristics, dummies capturing individual asset holdings, access to basic
services, survey answers on political and governance aspects and a measure of the extent
of current privatization in the country. The resulting sample includes between 61,576 and
82,139 individuals across 17 countries and 5 years.47
The eﬀect of corruption proves remarkably robust in all specifications, being significant
at the 1% level. The negative sign means, as expected, that an increase in the index (less
corruption) implies a higher level of satisfaction. In columns 2 to 5, the education level of
the survey respondent exhibits the expected inverse U-shaped pattern. Finally, in column
5, we interact corruption with dummies for basic, medium or superior education and
confirm that the eﬀect of corruption is stronger and more significant for individuals with
intermediate levels of education.
Table 1: Ordered probit estimations.
47The Latinobarometro survey was not carried out in 1999.
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual 
characteristics 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual assets   Yes Yes Yes 
Access to services   Yes Yes Yes 
Additional survey 
answers 
   Yes Yes 
Privatization 
proceeds 
   Yes Yes 
Corruption -0.052 
(6.40)** 
-0.052 
(6.37)** 
-0.044 
(5.32)** 
-0.030 
(3.04)** 
 
Education  0.038 
(4.81)** 
0.027 
(3.18)** 
0.026 
(2.77)** 
0.073 
(3.97)** 
Education2  -0.007 
(7.10)** 
-0.004 
(3.88)** 
-0.004 
(3.07)** 
-0.008 
(3.73)** 
Corruption * basic 
educ dummy 
    -0.023 
(2.13)* 
Corruption * med 
educ dummy 
    -0.033 
(3.24)** 
Corruption * sup 
educ dummy 
    -0.030 
(2.52)* 
N 82139 82119 78170 64329 61576 
Educ. threshold  2.73 3.27 3.64 4.38 
Ordered probit estimations. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%) 
Notes: Dependent variable is categorical variable on whether the privatizations of state enterprises have been 
beneficial to the country. It takes values 1 to 4 (1= strongly agrees, 2= agrees, 3= disagrees, 4= strongly disagrees). 
Individual characteristics include sex and age. Individual assets include dummies for color TV set, fridge, 
computer, wash machine, phone line, car, holiday house, tenancy vs. ownership. Access to services includes 
dummies for potable water, hot water and sewage. Additional survey answers refer to political and governance 
aspects: left/right, and trust in judicial power. Proceeds is a dummy equal to one if privatization proceeds exceed 
US$  2000 mill. Corruption and education are defined as previously.
These facts can be related straightforwardly to our theoretical framework. Indeed, we
expect individuals’ incentives to form groups and actively engage in watchdog activities,
and therefore their awareness of the level of corruption, to be related to the per-capita
stake as well as to their transaction costs of doing so. First, individuals have exoge-
nous characteristics, which are unlikely to be substantially modified by the occurrence of
privatizations.48
A pervasive characteristic of infrastructure services is the fact that some geographical
areas are more expensive to serve for a variety of reasons, including distance to the existing
network, low population density and low levels of consumption. Consumers in these areas
also have a lower likelihood to engage in monitoring activities and express concerns about
privatizations. Moreover, under public ownership, electricity, telecommunication or water
48McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) show that even the medium run eﬀect of privatization on income
is in general relatively small and is likely to be second order compared to the impact of other economic
events.
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networks in Latin America have typically failed to provide universal service to such less
profitable categories of consumers, general located in poor rural communities as well as
some less developed urban areas. The fact that many of them have gained access to the
service after the change in ownership is likely to exert an important and positive eﬀect
on their perception of the benefits of the process.49
On the other hand, middle class consumers have higher incentives to care about cor-
ruption, both for exogenous reasons linked to their characteristics and tradition, and
because they face higher stakes of doing so, as shown in the model. As they interpret any
evidence of corruption as operating a transfer, through higher prices, of a chunk of the
eﬃciency gains from them to corrupt politicians and firm managers, they indeed express
stronger dissatisfaction with the privatization process.
Looking more closely at prices, the policy literature suggests several mechanisms
through which such transfers may have been realized. The first one is a change in the
structure of taxes. In most Latin American countries, middle class households pay little
direct income taxes. On the other hand, privatizations have included significant increases
in more regressive indirect taxes as a way for the government to capture eﬃciency gains.
While in absolute terms the impact of privatization on middle class groups seem to have
been mostly neutral to positive (McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2003), this change in the
structure of prices and taxes is likely to have fuelled their perception of corruption. The
stylized facts are indeed consistent with the story in our model, in which governments and
firms conceal information on eﬃciency gains and agree on high service prices. The fact
that in many cases basic prices decreased, while tariﬀs including prices and indirect taxes
increased, seems to indicate that these taxes were used by government to subsequently
capture the surplus created by eﬃciency-enhancing privatizations.50
Finally, an additional potential channel involves quality eﬀects, as there is a presump-
tion that part of the price increases could in practice also have taken place through hidden
quality reductions (Estache, 2004). Indeed, quality concerns are a well known aspect of
high-powered regulatory schemes such as price caps. Again, insuﬃcient quality improve-
ments in the face of well publicized eﬃciency gains may have lead to the perception of an
unfair distribution of these gains, although more evidence is still due on this aspect.
49Empirically, access by new customers makes up the bulk of the positive welfare impact observed
in most sectors (McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2003). Note, however, that in many countries and sectors
significant aﬀordability problems remain for poor households, in particular in terms of connection costs
(Estache, 2004).
50See further evidence on the biased distribution of eﬃciency gains in Estache, Guasch and Trujillo
(2003).
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7 Conclusion
It is a well admitted point that the ownership pattern of firms has strong impact on
the hardness of their budget constraints, and thus has significant eﬀects on cost-reducing
investments. What is less known is the fact, stressed by our theoretical model, that
ownership also impacts on the incentives of corrupt politicians to engage in informed
side-deals and on the nature of those side-deals. Far from reducing corruption as it could
have been a priori thought, privatization only changes the pattern of corruption deals and
the identity of the groups most likely to suﬀer from it. Taxpayers suﬀer from corruption
when firms are public, while consumers are harmed in the case of private firms.
How the likelihood of corruption changes as sectors get privatized depends on fine
details like the cost of public funds of the economy under scrutiny, or the size of the in-
vestment undertaken in the privatized sector at hands. There is therefore no contradiction
between the fact that privatization triggers eﬃciency-enhancing investments by hardening
the firm’s budget constraint, and at the same time results in an increased likelihood of
corruption and more aggregate dissatisfaction.
Various stylized facts suggest that the absolute welfare impact of changes in own-
ership in infrastructure sectors is unlikely to explain by itself the extremely high level
of discontent observed throughout Latin America. They rather indicate that the polit-
ical economy of the process may matter, in the sense that a fraction of the population,
mostly the middle class, appears to be much more critical of privatization, probably on
the ground that they perceive the reforms as opening possibilities for corrupt deals that
they can only guess as consumers and, for this reason, consider themselves as the big
losers in this occasion.
As the theoretical model shows, one channel for this is the fact that the hardening of
the soft-budget constraint of public firms consecutive to the move to private ownership
has shifted the burden of corruption from the general budget and therefore taxpayers, to
the price of services, aﬀecting middle class consumers directly and more visibly. So, the
mixed results in terms of prices have fuelled discontent among the middle class, not so
much because of a huge impact on these households’ budget, but because their failure
to decrease to reflect much publicized eﬃciency gains was interpreted as evidence of a
corrupt allocation of eﬃciency gains in favor of firms and politicians.
Our model helps understand the skyrocketing discontent with privatizations expressed
by citizens all over Latin America and the Caribbean region in Latinobarometro opinion
surveys. As a matter of fact, this discontent appears to be strongly correlated with both
changes and absolute levels of corruption perceptions at the country level. Moreover,
this correlation is mostly driven by middle class groups, consistently with a framework in
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which they are both directly aﬀected by corrupt deals that drive prices up and they are
the more likely to organize and try to control wrongdoings in the privatization process.
Subsequent research should investigate further the structure of the dynamic political
equilibrium that may emerge from the repeated interactions between corrupted politicians,
individuals and interest groups, who might express their discontent towards privatization
through political actions. Far from being taken as exogenous as we did in our above
analysis, the degree of privatization and the nature of the sectors, which are actually
privatized, might then reflect the tension that corruptible politicians feel when torn be-
tween cajoling private interests and securing political support from middle classes. In
that respect, one major lesson of our findings is that, beyond the ownership structure in
itself, the transparency of the relationship between the State and infrastructure service
providers is a key ingredient to minimize the threat of corruption.
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Appendix
• Proof of Proposition 1: Let us first rewrite expected welfare with a benevolent
politician and public ownership as:
E
(θ,σ)
(W ) = νε(S(q∗) + λP (q∗)q∗ − (1 + λ)θq∗ − λU∗ − λV ∗)
+ν(1− ε)(S(q) + λP (q)q − (1 + λ)θq − λU − λV )
+(1− ν)(S(q¯) + λP (q¯)q¯ − (1 + λ)θ¯q¯ − λU¯ − λV¯ )
−(1 + λ)K(I)− I, (A1)
where I is the observable investment choice made by the firm.
The optimal contract maximizes (A1) subject to (4), (5), (6) and the following binding
participation constraints of the public oﬃcial
V ∗ = V = V¯ = 0, (A2)
since there is no need to pay the benevolent politician in any state of nature. All those
constraints are of course binding at the optimum. Hence, we get (9).
Inserting the corresponding values of the firm’s information rent in the diﬀerent states
of nature into the objective function and optimizing with respect to outputs yields (7)
and (8).
Finally, the firm chooses to invest to maximize its expected return. Given that the
only state of nature where the firm gets some information rent occurs with probability
ν(1 − ε), but that in this case the rent does not depend on the firm’s investment, we
trivially get:
Ie = argmax
I≥0
ν(1− ε)∆θq¯BPu − I = 0. (A3)
• Proof of Proposition 2: Expected social welfare with a benevolent politician who
does not need to be paid to report information can now be written as:
E
(θ,σ)
(W ) = νε(S(q∗)− θq∗) + ν(1− ε)(S(q)− θq) + (1− ν)(S(q¯)− θ¯q¯)−K(I)− I.
(A4)
Under private ownership, the optimal regulatory contract maximizes (A4) subject to
(5), the incentive constraint of an ineﬃcient firm and the participation constraints of both
types of firm:
U∗ = (P (q∗)− θ)q∗ −K(I) ≥ 0, (A5)
U¯ = (P (q¯)− θ¯)q¯ −K(I) ≥ 0, (A6)
36
where (A5) now replaces (4) and (A6) replaces (6).
Finally, (5) implies that, when σ = ∅, a θ-firm makes a positive profit.
To simplify the analysis we also assume that K(I) is not too large so that (A5) and
(A6) define non-empty constrained sets.
Of course, (A5) and (A6) are necessarily binding at the optimum. We denote λ∗(I) and
λ˜(I) the corresponding multipliers and note that increasing I reduces K(I) and relaxes
the constraints so that λ∗(·) and λ˜(·) decrease with I.
Similarly, setting q such that the eﬃcient firm breaks even (i.e., (P (q)− θ)q = K(I))
also violates the incentive constraint (5), which is thus again binding so that
(P (q)− θ¯)q = (P (q¯)− θ¯)q¯, (A7)
and thus q = q¯. Without transfer, the best that can be done is to oﬀer a pooling contract.51
Note that q¯BPr is lower when K(I) increases, i.e., when I decreases.
The firm chooses ex ante an investment level IPr such that
IPr = max
I≥0
ν(1− ε)∆θq¯BPr(I)− I,
where we make explicit the dependence of q¯BPr on I. This yields (15).
• Proof of Proposition 3: Note from (18) that k∗Pu ∈]0, 1[. Moreover making explicit
the dependence on λ:
dk∗Pu
dλ
= − 1
(1 + λ2)
F (kPu)
f(k∗Pu)
"
1 + λ
1+λ
d
dk
³
F
f
´ ¯¯¯¯
k∗Pu
# < 0
and thus 1− F (k∗Pu) increases with λ.
• Proof of Proposition 4: We optimize (17) subject to (4) and (5).Those constraints
are obviously binding, inserting their expression as function of outputs and optimizing
with respect to outputs yields the result.
51Indeed, since we have q¯BPr > q¯
M where q¯M is the monopoly output such that P (q¯M )−θ¯ = −P 0(q¯M )q¯M ,
from λ˜(I) > 0, we may have a solution q˜ < q¯M to (A7). However, this solution is always dominated from
a social welfare point of view since, when q¯M < qFB (where (P (qFB) = θ)), we have:
S(q¯BPr)− θq¯BPr > S(q¯M )− θq¯M > S(q˜)− θq˜.
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• Approximation for (20): When ∆θ is small enough, the right-hand side of (20) can
be approximated by:
1
(1 + λ)∆θq¯Pr
n
∆θq¯Pr + (P (q
∗
Pr
− θ)(q¯Pr − q∗Pr)
o
=
1
(1 + λ)∆θ
(
∆θ +
K(IPr)
q∗
Pr
q¯Pr
(q¯Pr − q∗Pr)
)
=
1
(1 + λ)∆θ
{P (q∗
Pr
)− P (q¯Pr)} = −
P 0(q∗
Pr
)(q∗
Pr
− q¯Pr)
(1 + λ)∆θ
=
P 0(q∗
Pr
)
(1 + λ)
³
P 0(q∗
Pr
) + K(IPr)
q∗
Pr
q¯Pr
´ = 1 + λ˜(I)
1 + λ
, (A8)
where the last equality uses (10) and (11). Finally, we obtain (21).
• Proof of Proposition 5: Direct from the text.
• Proof of Proposition 6: Taking again (17) as the objective function and optimizing
subject to (A5) and (A6) gives the result.
• The Consequences of Countervailing Power and the Role of Watchdogs:
Suppose that an interest group hurt by the threat of corruption may intervene as an
eﬀective watchdog, providing information on the politician’s misbehavior.52 This may be
by acquiring ex post information on σ conditionally on σˆ being uninformative. We will
assume that, if this interest group successfully reacts, it learns σ = θ with probability
one.
Let us derive the outcome of the model when consumers are active watchdogs under
private ownership. A politician when caught corrupted loses both the benefit of the bribe
he would have received otherwise and the benefits of holding oﬃce s∗ (because he may not
be reelected or he may be put in jail and lose his reputation and prestige). Under private
ownership, as consumers are the only checks on politician misbehavior, (16) becomes thus:
E
(θ,σ)
(WPr) = νεF
∙
s∗Pr
∆θq¯Pr
¸³
S(q∗
Pr
)− θq∗
Pr
− λs∗Pr
´
+νε(1− xconsPr )
Z 1
s∗
Pr
∆θq¯Pr
(S(q¯Pr)− θq¯Pr − (1− k˜)∆θq¯Pr)f(k˜)dk˜
+νεxconsPr
Z 1
s∗
Pr
∆θq¯Pr
(S(q∗
Pr
)− θq∗
Pr
)f(k˜)dk˜
+ν(1− ε)(S(q¯Pr)− θq¯Pr) + (1− ν)(S(q¯Pr)− θ¯q¯Pr)−K(IPr)− IPr.
52For a model along these lines see Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 15).
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In optimizing social welfare, we will assume that q∗
Pr
and q¯Pr are still given by the zero
profit constraints of the firm (11) and (13),53 so that the probability x that corruption is
detected and does not occur is taken as fixed.
The cut-oﬀ value k∗Pr now solves the following equation:
k∗Pr +
λ
1 + λ
F (k∗Pr)
f(k∗Pr)
=
(1− xconsPr )(S(q∗Pr)− θq
∗
Pr
− [S(q¯Pr)− θ¯q¯Pr])− xconsPr kPr∆θq¯Pr
(1 + λ)∆θq¯Pr
,
(A9)
with the following approximation when ∆θ is small enoughµ
1 +
x
1 + λ
¶
k∗Pr +
λ
1 + λ
F (k∗Pr)
f(k∗Pr)
=
Ã
1 + λ˜(IPr)
1 + λ
!
(1− x). (A10)
The impact of consumers’ ex post check is straightforwardly seen from (A10). It
unambiguously reduces the threat of corruption. Two eﬀects are nevertheless at work.
On the one hand, output is raised from q¯Pr to qPr in case corruption is detected. This
increases welfare and makes it more attractive to reduce the probability of corruption.
On the other hand, there is no longer any need to reward indirectly the politician through
bribes.
53This will typically be the case when x is small enough.
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